

This Memo to DCI

10 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : PB/NSC Coordinator

SUBJECT : DCI Pre-Briefs/Seminars/etc. (U)

1. A year ago, when presidential briefings were shifted from a weekly to a biweekly occurrence, we attempted to set up a schedule of briefings/seminars in order to meet your needs/interests. By using the time in the off-briefing week, we were able to provide a forum for a discussion of a wider variety of subjects than would have been the case if we were focusing on the presidential briefings alone. I believe that, on balance, this opportunity for an intellectual exchange of ideas was of benefit both to you and to those with whom you met (whether by way of feedback/stimulus to analysts in the work in which they were engaged or for DDO personnel in constructing meaningful CA programs.)

2. Unfortunately, schedules and events have reduced the effectiveness of this concept. The first to be affected was the Thursday morning DCI Seminar. This never really got off the ground because, shortly after the first meeting last fall, the events in Iran took everyone's time (first there were daily SCC meetings and then they were held every Tuesday and Thursday). The primary casualty of this has been any sort of regular meeting with the NIOs (in fact, I believe there have been only two such meetings in the last year).

3. Since June, the combined effects of the Venice Summit, vacations, the conventions and the Presidential campaign have effectively changed the presidential briefing schedule from biweekly to monthly, and what the schedule will be in the future is a matter of conjecture. As a result of this, we have not been maintaining a regular schedule of DCI pre-brief/screening sessions; this has further reduced the opportunities for you to sit down with analysts, etc., on subjects of interest. (We have, however, been able to have sessions on "crisis" topics (Iran, Poland, Soviet CPX) which, while necessary and important, do not afford you the opportunity to share ideas and shape other analytic efforts.)

4. I believe that, by and large, most of the sessions that we have had were worthwhile. I believe this to be true even in those circumstances when a subject was discussed under the guise of a potential presidential briefing subject that was determined at the session not to be so used (but was remanded for treatment in the PDB, or regular memo or whatever).

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5. There are, at any given time, a variety of general or topical subjects (other than Iran, Poland, etc.) which might be worth this type of treatment, whether as potential presidential briefing topics or simply as subjects for discussion. Would you want me to work with Gary to try and set up at least a hour a week in order to have some such discussion? ✓ Yes No. These meetings could either follow the development of a thrust outline or could simply be discussion sessions (for which we could suggest some questions in order to shape the dialogue). Then, at the meeting, if you wanted a briefing/memo developed, you could so indicate.

Following are some subjects that, depending on your time and interest, you might want to have pursued. (Please indicate in the appropriate space whether there is a subject you would like to have discussed and/or a brief paper or thrust outline prepared whether or not it is determined to be a potential presidential briefing subject):



	Discuss	Thrust Outline	Possible Pre-Brief	Skip
• Meeting with NIOs (around the world)	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• 	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
• Prospects for Namibia	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• Turkey (where is it going?)	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• What we know about the use of BW/CW; e.g. Ethiopia, Afghan, Kampuchea	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
• Collection tradeoff between Poland & Iran (D/OSR's question at last Poland Pre-Brief)	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>
• Philippines (are there forces for change?)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• Jamaica (will it be Manley or Seaga?)	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• Nicaragua (is revolution in trouble? being exported?)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• El Salvador (is US policy (?) working?)	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
• China (does NPC and/or US campaign suggest any changes in US-PRC relationship?)	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>

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	Discuss	Thrust Outline	Possible Pre-Brief	Skip
• Soviet energy (is CIA's estimate still valid?)	_____	_____	_____	✓
• Soviet mobilization planning/potential (study on subject almost complete)	_____	✓	_____	_____
• Effect of NPT conference on US policy	_____	✓	_____	_____
• Prospects for LRTNF dialogue	_____	✓	_____	_____
• Prospects for Middle East Peace (Camp David Accords)	✓	_____	_____	_____
• Update on situation on Korean Peninsula	_____	✓	_____	_____
• Review of any CA programs	_____	_____	_____	✓
• Bolivia (when is next coup likely?)	_____	_____	_____	✓
• Chile (prospects/constitutional ratification/Frei's new position--effect on US policy)	✓	_____	_____	_____
• Argentina (moving toward or away from the US?)	✓	_____	_____	_____

6. FYI: we are continuing to work on an Arabian Peninsula Security briefing for possible use at the next (24 September(?)) presidential briefing. Further, we will look at the two NIEs discussed at the NFIB to see if they merit consideration.

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